Governing the Commons: Difference between revisions
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excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective good once the good is | excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective good once the good is | ||
produced has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good. | produced has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good. | ||
*Swiss Alpine villages - Combining work days or days of reckoning (where the summer's | |||
cheese is distributed and assessments are made to cover the costs of the | |||
summer's work) with festiv:ties is another method for reducing some of Ehe . | |||
COSts associated with communal managemenr. |
Revision as of 07:23, 14 December 2018
In this pioneering book Elinor Ostrom tackles one of the most enduring and contentious questions of positive political economy, whether and how the exploration of common-pool resources can be organized in a way that avoids both excessive consumption and administrative cost
Notes
- "The prisoner's dilemma game fascinates scholars". What is paadoxical if the players are simply unethical, as opposed to "rational"? That society considers lack of Ethics as "rational" is the start of the problem. It is not rational. It is plain dumb. -op ed
- Olson - Logic of Collective Action -
Olson's argument rests largely on the premise that one who cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective good once the good is produced has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good.
- Swiss Alpine villages - Combining work days or days of reckoning (where the summer's
cheese is distributed and assessments are made to cover the costs of the summer's work) with festiv:ties is another method for reducing some of Ehe . COSts associated with communal managemenr.